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Abstract
Position sensors, such as the gyroscope, the magnetometer and the accelerometer, are found in a staggering variety of
devices, from smartphones and UAVs to autonomous robots. Several works have shown how adversaries can mount
spoofing attacks to remotely corrupt or even completely control the outputs of these sensors. With more and more
critical applications relying on sensor readings to make important decisions, defending sensors from these attacks is of
prime importance.
In this work we present practical software based defenses against attacks on two common types of position sensors,
specifically the gyroscope and the magnetometer. We first characterize the sensitivity of these sensors to acoustic and
magnetic adversaries. Next, we present two software-only defenses: a machine learning based single sensor defense,
and a sensor fusion defense which makes use of the mathematical relationship between the two sensors. We performed
a detailed theoretical analysis of our defenses, and implemented them on a variety of smartphones, as well as on a
resource-constrained IoT sensor node. Our defenses do not require any hardware or OS-level modifications, making it
possible to use them with existing hardware. Moreover, they provide a high detection accuracy, a short detection time
and a reasonable power consumption.
Keywords: sensor spoofing, sensor fusion, machine learning
1. Introduction
Many electronic devices, such as smartphones and sen-
sor nodes, are equipped with position sensors. These sen-
sors are capable of measuring the position, orientation and
motion of the device in three-dimensional space. We rely
on these sensors for increasingly sensitive tasks including
authenticationConti et al. [5], Lee and Lee [20], naviga-
tionLi et al. [21], and health monitoringEllis et al. [10].
This paper focuses on two widely used sensors: the gyro-
scope, which measures a device’s angular momentum, or
rate of rotation, and the magnetometer, which measures a
device’s orientation with respect to the magnetic field of
the Earth.
Several recent works have shown how the readings of
these sensors can be spoofed by applying an external acous-
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Figure 1: Overall Description of our Defenses
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tic stimulus to the device or its surroundings Trippel et al.
[31], Tu et al. [32]. The spoofed output of a sensor does not
reflect the device’s actual rotation or orientation; instead,
the output is overwritten by artificial values which are ei-
ther randomly corrupted or completely controlled by the
attacker. Sensor spoofing attacks on smartphones are al-
ready being used for malicious purposes. For example, the
online publication Sixth Tone reported on June 2018 that
Chinese university students, who are required to reach at
least 10,000 steps per day as part of their fitness require-
ment, use a variety of devices called “WeRun Boosters” to
spoof the motion sensors on their smartphones, generating
6,000 to 7,000 steps on a smartphone per hourYujie [36].
The risks associated with sensor spoofing will only grow as
the amount of sensitive applications relying on these sen-
sors increases. For example, Wang et al. Wang et al. [35]
and Reinertsen et al.Reinertsen et al. [23] proposed to use
sensor measurements to assess the severity of illness of pa-
tients with schizophrenia. Sensor spoofing attacks, when
applied to this scenario, may erroneously cause a person
to be hospitalized in a psychiatric ward.
While several papers have discussed sensor spoofing,
few of them have discussed the prevention of these at-
tacks, a gap we wish to address in this work. One of the
main limitations of many defenses against sensor spoofing
is that they either require changes to the sensor hardware
or to the low-level firmware used to interface it to the
phone’s CPU. Since position sensors are typically highly
integrated low cost devices with a relatively long devel-
opment cycles, such modifications are difficult to apply
to hardware already deployed in the field and, are hard
to justify from a system integration standpoint. While
software-based anomaly detection mechanisms have been
proposed for other types of sensor systems, such as wire-
less sensor networks de Lima Pinto et al. [8], they typically
did not consider a malicious adversary but only a random
fault model.
Our Contribution: In this paper we propose two
software-based defense methods against acoustic and mag-
netic attacks on a phone’s gyroscope and magnetometer.
Our first defense method, SDI-1, uses machine learning to
detect anomalies in the output of a single sensor. This
defense method can detect sensor corruption attacks, but
cannot detect cases where a more powerful adversary can
force the sensor to output a spoofed but valid reading.
Our second defense method, SDI-2, applies sensor fusion
to compare the readings of multiple sensors measuring a
similar type of motion. This method can potentially pro-
tect against a more powerful sensor spoofing adversary, as
long as this adversary cannot control the entire set of sen-
sors available on the device. Specifically, in this paper we
present single-sensor defenses for acoustic attacks on the
gyroscope and for magnetic attacks on the magnetometer.
We also present a sensor fusion based defense combining
the gyroscope and the magnetometer. We describe the
physical and mathematical relationship between expected
sensor readings, and show how the defender can measure
deviations between the two sensors to detect an attack. We
implemented our defenses on multiple smartphones from
different vendors, as well as on a resource-constrained IoT
node, in each case measuring the accuracy, detection time
and power usage of our defenses. The main advantage
of these defenses are that they are purely software based,
and can therefore be deployed on many types of devices
without any hardware modification.
Document Structure: We begin by describing the
spoofing attacks on the MEMS gyroscope and magnetome-
ter. In Section 2 we describe SDI-1, a machine learning-
based single sensor defense, and SDI-2, a sensor fusion-
based single sensor defense, and show how they can pro-
tect against acoustic and magnetic attacks on the gyro-
scope and on the magnetometer respectively. In Section 3
we perform a practical evaluation of our defense methods.
Finally, in Section 5 we discuss defenses for another type of
sensor, the accelerometer, and conclude by discussing fur-
ther applications of sensor fusion and its improvements.
1.1. Types of Position Sensors
A smartphone’s various position sensors are used to
measure the phone’s position and motion in space along
the six axes of motion (or six degrees of freedom). The
measurements of the device’s sensors are generally pro-
vided in the device’s frame of reference: a Cartesian co-
ordinate system with coordinates attached to the device.
This coordinate system is rotated with respect to the world’s
frame of reference, which is a standard static coordinate
system. Of the six degrees of freedom, three coordinates
(X, Y, and Z) are used to describe the phone’s position and
linear motion in space, while the three other coordinates
(ρ,φ and θ, or pitch, roll and yaw) are used to describe
the phone’s Cartesian axes orientation with respect to the
world’s frame of reference and its rotational motion.
The gyroscope is a MEMS-based sensor which mea-
sures the device’s angular velocity in units of radian per
second. As described in Son et al. [30], Microelectrome-
chanical systems (MEMS) gyroscopes typically contain a
small mass moving back and forth at a constant frequency.
As the phone is rotated, the Coriolis effect acts on this
moving mass and causes it to vibrate with an amplitude
that is directly related to the angular rotation rate. The
modulated vibration amplitude is then converted to volt-
age, typically by a capacitive or piezo-electric sensor. The
magnetometer, or compass, measures the direction and
magnitude of the ambient magnetic field around the de-
vice, in units of microtesla. As described inJiang et al.
[17], virtually all smartphones use a Hall effect magne-
tometer, which works by detecting the voltage differential
induced by the Hall effect across a thin metallic surface in
response to a magnetic field perpendicular to the surface.
The magnetic field measured by the phone field is typically
a combination of the Earth’s magnetic field, which points
more or less to the north, and additional magnetic sources
in the vicinity of the phone, such as iron beams, electric
motors or induction coils. As long as the phone stays in
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the same place and the additional magnetic sources stay
constant over time, the magnetometer’s reading will point
to the same direction in the world’s reference frame, even
when the phone is rotated. Other common position sen-
sors include the accelerometer, which measures the linear
acceleration of the device and the GPS sensor which mea-
sures the location of the device on Earth.
1.2. Spoofing Attacks on Position Sensors
As mentioned in the previous section, MEMS gyro-
scopes contain a small moving mass. As shown in Tu et al.
[32] and Son et al. [30], they are vulnerable to acoustic
attacks, in which the sensor is subjected to external vi-
brations with the sensor’s mechanical resonant frequency.
When the moving mass inside the sensor is stimulated by
this acoustic signal, it begins vibrating with a high am-
plitude. This prevents the sensor from interacting with
the environment, allowing its reading to be controlled by
the attacker. In other words, a high-frequency audio sig-
nal at a specific frequency can bring these sensors into a
state of resonance, corrupting their outputs. The source
of the disruptive signal can be an external device situ-
ated next to the phone, or even the phone’s own speaker
Block et al. [1]. Acoustic attacks on MEMS-based gyro-
scopes and accelerometers were first presented by Son et
al. in Son et al. [30] in the context of drones, and later
shown by Trippel et al. [31], Farshteindiker et al. [12] to
be applicable to smartphone sensors as well. Tu et al.
in Tu et al. [32] performed a comprehensive evaluation
of out-of-band signal injection methods to deliver adver-
sarial control of embedded MEMS inertial sensors on a
wide variety of devices including self balancing scooters,
stabilizers, smartphones, VR headsets and other similar
devices. Similarly, an adversary equipped with a magnetic
coil is able to spoof the outputs of the magnetometer, an
effect put to productive use in Jiang et al. [17]. Recog-
nizing the increasing risk caused by current and emerging
sensor spoofing attacks, the Industrial Control Systems
Cyber Emergency Response Team of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (ICS-CERT) stated recently that it
considers orientation sensor attacks as a "threat to critical
infrastructure"CERT [3].
Generally speaking, there are two types of spoofing at-
tacks: corruption attacks, which we refer to as sensor rock-
ing attacks (following the nomenclature of Son et al. [30])
and rewriting attacks, which we refer to as sensor rolling
attacks (for reasons of symmetry). Sensor rocking attacks
replace the sensor readings with arbitrary corrupted val-
ues which are unrelated to the external environment. For
example, the attacker can replace the sensor signal with
a high frequency sine wave or random noise. While the
attacker cannot control the shape of this corrupted signal,
the attacker can turn the disruptive signal on and off at
will. In fact, Farshteindiker et al. [12] and Jiang et al. [17]
used this ability as a data transmission mechanism. Sen-
sor rolling attacks are a stronger class of attack, in which
the attacker completely replaces the sensor readings with
values of their choosing. Since the attacker can create any
sensor readings including replaying previous readings, de-
fense methods that detect anomalies will not be effective
against rolling attacks.
In this work, we replicate two types of acoustic attacks
on the gyroscope, as shown in Farshteindiker et al. [12] and
Tu et al. [32], to collect data and test our defense meth-
ods. While Farshteindiker et al. [12] used a piezoelectric
speaker kept in close proximity to the phone, Tu et al.
[32] used regular speakers connected to an amplifier to at-
tack the gyroscope from a distance. Both attacks work
by using the sensor’s mechanical resonant frequency. To
spoof the magnetometer, we used a solenoid connected to
a waveform generator as magnetic field source similar to
the methods of Shoukry et al. [26]. The high sensitivity
of the magnetometer makes it extremely vulnerable to the
presence of any external magnetic field, sometimes even to
the magnet in the phone’s own speaker W3C [34].
2. Defense Methods
In this work we implement and evaluate two purely
software-based approaches for sensor spoofing detection.
The first approach, SDI-1, uses machine learning tech-
niques applied to sensor output to detect anomalies. The
second approach, SDI-2, is a novel fusion-based detector
which works by examining multiple sensor outputs. Since
these defenses apply signal processing and machine learn-
ing, it is important to examine the resource consumption of
the defense methods both in terms of processing time and
of power consumption. It is also important to determine
the response time of the countermeasures. If the counter-
measure has a very high response time, it may be possible
for an attacker to evade detection by spoofing the outputs
for just a very short amount of time. To demonstrate the
generic nature of our defenses across all kinds of devices,
we perform the attacks and test our defenses on various
smartphones, as well as an IoT node, as listed in Table 1,
representing a wide variety of electronic devices with dif-
ferent constraints in terms of CPU capabilities, memory
and power consumption.
2.1. SDI-1: Machine Learning-Based Single Sensor De-
fense
The key idea behind SDI-1 is to train a machine learn-
ing model that can detect an anomaly (an attack) on the
sensor output. To enable this defense, the defender gen-
erates many traces of benign sensor outputs and ideally
traces of known attacks as well. Detection can either be
performed by a two-sided classifier, which is trained both
on benign and spoofed traces, or by a one-sided classifier,
which is only trained on benign traces; detection takes
place when a new trace deviates significantly from the be-
nign traces. The advantage of the single sensor approach is
that it requires no additional inputs other than the sensor
readings themselves. Thus, it can be implemented inside
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Device Gyroscope Magnetometer
Samsung Galaxy S5 InvenSense MPU-6500 AKM AK09911c
Samsung Galaxy S6 InvenSense MPU-6500 Yamaha YAS532
LG Nexus 5X Bosch Sensortec BMI160 Bosch Sensortec BMM150
iPhone SE InvenSense EMS-A Alps Electric HSCDTD007
STM32L4 IoT Node STMicroelectronics LSM6DSL STMicroelectronics LIS3MDL
Table 1: Gyroscope and magnetometer sensors used in various test devices
the sensor hardware (or inside its manufacturer-provided
driver) and does not require any high-level changes to the
system. A possible short-coming of this defense is that the
two-sided classifier must be trained on previously encoun-
tered and known attack traces. Any new spoofing method
which results in different attacker characteristics will not
be detected. This can be overcome by using a one-sided
classifier which only needs to be trained on benign traces.
In this case, any new trace which is significantly different
from a benign trace will be identified as an attack. The
disadvantage of this approach is that it only works for sen-
sor rocking (corruption) attacks, and not for sensor rolling
(overwriting) attacks; indeed, if an adversary can choose
arbitrary values for the sensor, the attacker can simply re-
play values recorded by the sensor in the past which cannot
be identified as anomalies.
Training a classifier directly on high-dimensional data,
such as sensor readings over time, is inefficient and can
cause over-fitting. Thus, before the learning algorithm op-
erates on the traces, each trace must be reduced into a
small set of succinct features. In Das et al. [7, 6] the au-
thors suggested a selection of features that are relevant for
positional sensor readings, and we use this set in our work
as well.
When designing our detector, we aimed to create a
detector which is both effective and explainable. Non-
explainable classifiers, such as ensemble-based methods or
those based on deep learning, are less appropriate in a
fraud detection setting, since they do not clearly indicate
the reason for the detector’s particular output. We were
interested in selecting a classifier that has a simple inter-
nal structure and is therefore less sensitive to adversarial
learning scenarios, where the attacker has some access to
the training set. We looked for classifiers which had high
accuracy and are less resource intensive, so that our de-
fense method can be applied on a wide range of devices.
The single sensor defense can be implemented for all
position sensors. In this work, we focus on defenses against
acoustic attacks targeting the gyroscope and magnetic at-
tacks targeting the magnetometer. We briefly discuss de-
fenses against acoustic attacks targeting the accelerometer
in Subsection 5.2.
2.2. SDI-2: Fusion-Based Multiple Sensor Defense
The key insight behind the second defensive approach
is that the defender has an information advantage over
the attacker whereby instead of being limited to a sin-
gle sensor, the defender can compare the current readings
of multiple different sensors measuring the same physical
phenomenon. If the sensors do not agree with each other,
it can indicate that an attack is in progress. The advan-
tage of this approach is that it works for both rocking and
rolling attacks (i.e., even a completely valid sensor trace
replayed by the attacker will be detected if other sensors
on the system do not agree with it). Furthermore, this
method is generic and future-proof in the sense that it
does not depend on the characteristics of a specific attack
method, but rather on the immunity of the gyroscope to
magnetic attacks and, correspondingly, on the immunity of
the magnetometer to acoustic attacks. To carry out fusion-
based defense in practice, we first derive the mathematical
relationships between the readings of different sensors, in
this case the gyroscope and the magnetometer. To this
end, we apply some basic Newtonian physics principles,
as described below. Once the mathematical relationships
are identified, it is possible to use the waveform output
of one sensor to approximate the other sensor, or to use
both sensors to calculate the same intermediate waveform.
Then, we can measure the extent to which the two sensor
readings agree, by applying some sort of distance measure
between the two waveforms.
Sensor fusion has its own advantages and disadvan-
tages as a countermeasure, as compared to single sensor
detectors. Its main disadvantage is that it has to accom-
modate at least twice the amount of measurement noise,
since it depends on multiple physical sensors. To high-
light the different between the methods, we first evaluate
a threshold-based sensor fusion detector based on a simple
distance measure, namely the mean squared error (MSE).
We then show how this detector can be improved by com-
bining both sensor fusion and machine learning methods.
The cornerstone of our fusion-based countermeasure is
an equation relating the readings of two different posi-
tion sensors. The device’s sensor measurements are pre-
sented in a Cartesian coordinate system (Xd, Yd, Zd). This
is the coordinate system (reference frame) attached to the
device. This coordinate system can be rotated with re-
spect to a fixed, Cartesian, or world coordinate system,
(X,Y, Z) , in which the axes follow the North-East-Down
(NED) convention: X = north, Y = east and Z = down.
The world frame is assumed to be inertial, ignoring the
rotational motion of the Earth. Note that the origins of
the two reference frames stay attached; translational de-
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grees of freedom are not accounted for. At some time
instance t, the altitude of the device frame with respect to
the world frame is represented by a set of time dependent
Tait-Bryan angles (φ, θ, ψ) . These are Euler angles where
the sequence of rotations is x-y-z, known also as roll, pitch
and yaw. The transformation from the inertial frame to
the device frame is the rotation:
R(φ, θ, ψ) = R(φ)R(θ)R(ψ) (1)
where:
R(ψ) =
 cos (ψ) sin (ψ) 0− sin (ψ) cos (ψ) 0
0 0 1
 (2)
is a rotation around the initial Z axis,
R(θ) =
 cos (θ) 0 − sin (θ)0 1 0
sin (θ) 0 cos (θ)
 (3)
is a rotation around the intermediate Y axis, and
R(φ) =
 1 0 00 cos (φ) sin (φ)
0 − sin (φ) cos (φ)
 (4)
is a rotation around the final X axis. A general vector is
represented in the rotated reference frame by:
~Gd = R(φ, θ, ψ)~Gw (5)
To link the readings of the gyroscope and the mag-
netometer, we need to express the angular velocity ~ω in
terms of the rotation angles (ψ, θ, φ). The angular veloc-
ity components along the axes ψˆ, θˆ, φˆ perpendicular to the
rotations are given by:
ωψ = ψ˙, ωθ = θ˙, ωφ = φ (6)
The directions of these components of ~ω cannot con-
stitute an orthogonal coordinate system; each rotation is
made in a different reference frame. The transformation
matrices R(ψ), R(θ), R(φ) can be used to project the angu-
lar velocity components on the Cartesian coordinate sys-
tem axes of the device frame Goldstein et al. [13]. We note
that the first transformation is done by rotating around the
original z axis. Therefore, ωˆψ is directed along the original
(world frame) z axis. In order to obtain the components
of ~ω in the device frame we should use the full rotation
R(φ, θ, ψ). The next rotation axis ωˆθ coincides with the
intermediate y axis and therefore should be transformed
by R(φ). The third axis of rotation ωˆθ coincides with the
final x axis and therefore does not undergo a transforma-
tion. For each Cartesian component of ~ω we can sum up
the contributions of the projections. As a result of this
procedure, the angular velocity in Cartesian coordinates
of the device frame is given by:
ωxd =φ˙− ψ˙ sin (θ)
ωyd =θ˙ cos (φ) + ψ˙ cos (θ) sin (φ)
ωzd =− θ˙ sin (φ) + ψ˙ cos (θ) cos (φ) (7)
We also note that the angular velocity transforms, as any
other vector would do, from the world frame to the device
frame:
~ωd = R (φ, θ, ψ) ~ωw (8)
In the remainder of this paper we exploit the fact that
one can associate the angles of rotation (φ, θ, ψ) with the
angular velocity of the device, together with the equa-
tion 5, in order to relate the angular velocity in the de-
vice frame (measurements of the gyroscope) to the rate of
change in the magnetic field as measured by the rotating
device (measurements of the magnetometer).
Magnetic Field Time Derivative in the Device
Frame. Consider an arbitrary magnetic field, constant
and uniform in the world frame:
~Bw = (Bx, By, Bz)
thus:
d ~Bw
dt
= 0
In order to obtain the magnetic field in the reference frame
of the device, the rotation matrix 1 is used:
~Bd(t) = R(t) ~Bw (9)
We take the derivative of 9 with respect to time to obtain:
d ~Bd
dt
=
d
(
R(t) ~Bw
)
dt
=
d (R(t))
dt
~Bw
We use the fact that the rotation matrix is orthogonal,
R−1 = RT , and therefore RRT = RTR = 1, and multiply
the right-hand side by RT (t)R(t) = 1:
d ~Bd
dt
=
d (R(t))
dt
RT (t)R(t) ~Bw
or:
d ~Bd
dt
=
[
d (R(t))
dt
RT (t)
]
~Bd.
Calculations using 7 show that d(R(t))dt R
T (t) is a skew-
symmetric matrix obeying:
d (R(t))
dt
RT (t) =
 0 ωzd −ωyd−ωzd 0 ωxd
ωyd −ωxd 0

and multiplication of the matrix d(R(t))dt R
T (t) with the
magnetic field vector is equivalent to the negative of the
cross product of angular velocity with the magnetic field
6vector. Thus, the final mathematical relationship between
the measurements of the magnetometer and the gyroscope
is given by:
d ~Bd
dt
= −~ωd × ~Bd (10)
A similar equation can be derived for the accelerometer-
Doppler sensor pair as well (see Section 4).
3. Evaluation
We evaluated the defenses for the gyroscope by first
reproducing the two acoustic attacks on the gyroscope as
mentioned in Farshteindiker et al. [12] and Tu et al. [32].
To reproduce the attack of Farshteindiker et al. [12], we
used a PUI Audio APS2509S-T-R piezoelectric transducer
connected to a Picoscope 2206BMSO supported by Pico-
scope software v6.13.7.707 used as a waveform generator.
To reproduce the attack in Tu et al. [32], we used a 4x2
dual channel PUI Audio AS06608PS-2-R speaker array
with 8Ω impedance, connected to a Lepy LP-2051 audio
amplifier which received input from the same Picoscope
2206BMSO. To perform automated frequency sweeps and
frequency switches, we wrote a series of Python script
which could control the Picoscope using the libraries pro-
vided by Picotech.
To evaluate the defenses for the magnetometer, we
used an air-core solenoid with a 50Ω impedance, con-
nected to the same Picoscope 2206BMSO waveform gen-
erator through an amplifier. Our test devices, as listed in
Table 1, include a variety of smartphones from multiple
vendors, as well as an STM32L475VG IoT node manufac-
tured by STMicroelectronics. To collect the traces from
the phone, we wrote a custom Android application that
timestamped the sensor readings and uploaded them to
an experiment server. The server is capable of control-
ling various components like the frequency of the wave,
the number of traces to be collected and the duration of
each trace. The IoT node was running custom C++ code
written using the Mbed framework.
3.1. Methodology
The benign traces from all the phones were collected
while the phone was being subjected to typical user activ-
ities like walking, running, at rest on the table, at rest in
a pocket, and while the phone was being randomly shaken
(in which we also included the motions required to play
various video games).
To carry out the acoustic attack, we first had to iden-
tify the resonance frequency of the device. Tu et. al.
in Tu et al. [32] listed the resonance frequency range of
devices using the same sensor model as our test devices.
We used our experiment server to sweep through the res-
onance frequency range and plotted the frequency against
the variance of the sensor reading to pin-point the res-
onance frequency of the gyroscope. We determined the
resonance frequency of the MPU - 6500 series family of
gyroscope used in out test smartphones to be 27.243 kHz,
and that of the LSM6DSL chip used in the IoT node to be
19.718 kHz.
Since Farshteindiker et al. [12] uses a piezoelectric speaker
attached to the phone, the attack traces were collected not
only when the phone was at rest but also when it was be-
ing moved (walking, running, shaking etc.). However when
the attack mentioned in Tu et al. [32] was carried out, the
device was at rest as described in the paper. The distance
between the speaker array and the test device was 0.3 m.
The IoT node was programmed to replicate the function-
ing of a self-balancing scooter, one of the main test devices
in Tu et al. [32]. A servo FS5103R motor was connected
to the IoT node which rotated based on the feedback of
the gyroscope. The benign traces from the IoT gyroscope
included the sensor data when the device is at rest, when
subjected to a repetitive to and fro motion, and when sub-
jected to random shaking motions.
To carry out the magnetic attack on the gyroscope,
we found that we were able to achieve maximum intensity
and range of attack when the frequency of the wave was
1 Hz. The magnetometer attack traces included sensor
traces when the solenoid was directed at the phone from
different directions and orientations; these variations af-
fect different axes differently. To simulate a rolling attack,
in which the sensor reading is arbitrarily determined by
the attacker, we created random pairings of benign gyro-
scope and magnetometer readings, each from a different,
independent measurement session.
In total, from each phone we had 500 benign traces
(100 traces each of walking, running, at rest on the table,
at rest in a pocket, and random shaking) of each sensor,
500 acoustic attack traces (250 traces of each acoustic at-
tack) of the gyroscope and 500 magnetic attack traces of
the magnetometer. From the IoT node we had 1500 be-
nign traces (500 traces each of at rest, under to and fro mo-
tion, and random shaking) and 1500 acoustic attack traces
(all traces collected under acoustic attack mentioned in Tu
et al. [32]). The number of benign and malicious traces col-
lected were kept equal, to provide balanced classes for the
machine learning training algorithms. The sensors were
sampled at the highest possible sampling rate: 200 Hz for
the gyroscope and 100 Hz for the magnetometer.
3.2. SDI-1: Single Sensor Defense
As mentioned earlier, training a classifier directly on
high-dimensional data, such as sensor readings over time,
is inefficient and can cause over-fitting. Thus, before the
learning algorithm operates on the traces, each trace must
be reduced into a small set of succinct features. Das et
al. in Das et al. [6] identified a list of features relevant for
smartphone sensors in a different context. The data col-
lected from the gyroscope is a stream of timestamped real
values. Since we obtain the values from the three axes,
the value is a vector consisting of x, y and z values asso-
ciated with a specific point in time. The vector can be
converted to a scalar by obtaining the L2 norm which is
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Figure 2: (a) Attacking the gyroscope (b) Carrying out power analysis on Galaxy S5
L2 =
√
x2 + y2 + z2 . Another approach would be to look
at the readings of only one axis. Das et al. summaries the
characteristics of a sensor data stream by exploring a set of
25 features consisting of 10 temporal and 15 spectral fea-
tures. With the help of a domain expert we also identified
a new feature to represent the sensor data: max_val_fft,
which is the maximum value of the fast Fourier transform
of the sensor data stream. To analyze the relative impor-
tance of each feature, we used MATLAB’s implementation
of the Relieff algorithm Kononenko et al. [18], with k =20.
The top ranking features and their corresponding weights
are listed in Table 2.
Rank Feature Feature
Importance Weight
1 Max val fft 0.0520
2 Max 0.0514
3 Mean 0.0409
4 Min 0.0396
5 Average
Deviation
0.0341
6 RMS 0.0329
7 Standard
Deviation
0.0282
8 ZCR 0.0052
Table 2: Importance of each feature, according to the Relieff algo-
rithm
3.2.1. Detecting Attack on Gyroscope on Smartphone
After extracting the features from the raw traces, we
used MATLAB’s Classification Learner tool to train and
test various machine learning models using a 10-fold cross
validation scheme. The performance of the various classi-
fiers we evaluated is presented in Table 3. As shown in the
table, SDI-1 achieves a very high detection rate for all of
the devices we implemented.
To evaluate the effectiveness of SDI-1 on the smart-
phone in an online setting, we selected the classification
tree algorithm due to its consistently high accuracy and
simple internal structure. We exported the structure of
the trained tree from MATLAB, and developed an app
in Android studio which implements the classification tree
to detect the attack on the phone. The app also made it
possible to explore different sampling window sizes, while
keeping track of the true positives, true negatives, false
positives and false negatives so that we can calculate the
detection accuracy of the model. The app was initially
installed on a Galaxy S5. On initial testing we found that
despite the high accuracy shown when tested in MATLAB,
our model had a very high false positive and false nega-
tive rate, especially when the sampling window was small
when detecting in real-time. On inspecting the scatter
plot which plots the various features used by the classifi-
cation tree, we identified that the features we used were
not able to separate the attack and normal user activity.
This indicated that the features were not able to effectively
separate between various acoustic attacks and typical user
activities in real-time.
To overcome this shortcoming, instead of extracting
the features from the L2 norm, we extracted the features
from the individual axes. This required the calculation of
eight features (Table 2) on data from three axes. To reduce
the number of calculations, we decided to remove two fea-
tures: ZCR (lowest rank) and max_val_fft (calculation
complexity). This leaves us with a total of six features
for each of the three axes, for a total of 18 features. The
classification tree was trained again using Classification
Learner in MATLAB and the model was implemented in
the app. On testing this model showed good performance,
irrespective of the sampling window as shown in Table 4.
To calculate the real time accuracies, each attack detected
when the phone was actually under was considered as a
true positive (TP) and each attack our defense failed to
detect was considered as a false negative (FN). During
typical user activity (no-attack) each falsely detected at-
tack was considered a false positive (FP) and rest as true
negatives (TN). Accuracy was calculated using the formula
Accuracy = TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN . Several minutes of testing
was done on all the devices under various attack and no-
attack scenarios to calculate its accuracy.
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Type Classifier Galaxy S5 Nexus 5X Galaxy S6 iPhone SE
Tree
Simple 98.9 92.9 96.7 100
Medium 98.9 96.2 96.7 100
Complex 98.9 96.2 96.7 100
Regression Logistic Regression 86.9 76.7 99.0 100
SVM
Linear 85.7 73.8 98.6 100
Quadratic 97.0 91.0 99.0 100
Cubic 99.3 96.7 99.0 100
Fine Gaussian 99.6 97.6 99.5 99.7
Medium Gaussian 95.1 90.5 98.6 99.9
KNN
Fine 99.0 96.2 100.0 99.9
Coarse 86.1 70.0 77.6 97.7
Medium 96.4 91.4 98.6 99.9
Cosine 94.4 92.9 97.6 99.9
Cubic 95.5 91.9 96.7 99.9
Weighted 97.4 96.7 99.5 99.9
Ensemble Bagged Tree 99.8 98.6 99.5 100Subspace KNN 99.4 96.2 98.6 99.9
Table 3: Offline accuracy (%) of SDI-1 machine learning classifiers for gyroscope using 10-fold cross validation
Phone Sensor Sampling
Window
(sec)
Accuracy (%)
Galaxy S5
Gyroscope
1 98.42
2 98.18
5 98.33
Magnetometer
1 98.20
2 98.94
5 97.64
Nexus 5X
Gyroscope
1 97.77
2 99.04
5 98.18
Magnetometer
1 99.08
2 98.75
5 98.33
Table 4: Real time accuracy (%) of SDI-1 with different sampling
windows
One-Sided Classification: As discussed earlier, in
one-sided classification the classifier is trained only using
the benign data and is tested on both the benign and ma-
licious data. The main advantage of this method is that,
in contrast to a two-sided classification which anticipate
all attacks ahead of time, a one-sided classifier will be ef-
fective against new attacks, as long as they sufficiently
deviate from the training data.
The fitcsvm function in MATLAB was used for one-
sided classification, based on the S5 data set. The data
table consisting of the features and the labels were divided
into two parts (train and test). The benign instances from
the first part were used to generate the model using the
fitcsvm function. The data from the second part was used
to test the model. The labels from the test table were re-
moved and the model was made to predict each instance
as one or zero representing an attack and no-attack respec-
tively. The classifier gave 99.20% accuracy in this case.
We also tested one-sided classification of the Nexus 5X
and the Galaxy S6, albeit with smaller data sets, resulting
in accuracies of 71.69% and 75.47% for the Nexus 5X and
Galaxy S6 respectively.
3.2.2. Detecting Attack on Gyroscope on IoT node
As mentioned in Section 3.1, we collected 1500 be-
nign and 1500 acoustic attack traces from the gyroscope.
Considering the severely constrained resources of the IoT
node, we selected the five simplest features from Table
2: max, mean, min, standard deviation and average de-
viation. The features were extracted from the L2 of the
traces and then used to train a simple tree using the Classi-
fication Learner tool of MATLAB, resulting in a detection
accuracy of 99.8% in the offline model after 5-fold cross
validation. The tree which was trained using MATLAB
was implemented on the IoT node. We programmed an
LED to turn on every time an attack was detected. We
also wrote a program to keep track of the true positives,
true negatives, false positives and false negatives. After
extensive testing under attack and under normal condi-
tions, we obtained an accuracy of 98.03% with a sampling
window of 5 ms. This proves that this defense method
is efficient and effective in a wide range of devices, even
under high resource constraints. In this case, unlike when
using the Galaxy S5, we were able to obtain high accuracy
using the features extracted from L2 norms.
3.2.3. Detecting Attack on Magnetometer on Smartphone
Similar to the implementation of the single sensor de-
fense on the gyroscope, the single sensor defense was im-
plemented on the magnetometer. The accuracies of var-
ious machine learning models under K-fold cross valida-
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Type Classifier Accuracy (%)
Tree
Simple 91.4
Medium 90.3
Complex 80.4
Regression Logistic Regression 89.8
SVM
Linear 87.4
Quadratic 90.4
Cubic 95.0
Fine Gaussian 93.8
Medium Gaussian 92.3
KNN
Fine 93.1
Medium 91.2
Coarse 76.4
Cosine 91.2
Cubic 90.5
Weighted 93.0
Ensemble Bagged Tree 94.9Subspace KNN 94.3
Table 5: Offline accuracy (%) of SDI-1 machine learning classifiers
for the magnetometer using 10-fold cross validation
tion using the Classification Learner tool in MATLAB are
shown in Table 5. The trained classification tree was im-
plemented on the phone using our Android app. Unlike
the gyroscope, the model provided good accuracy (Table
4) using features extracted from L2norms. This shows that
for Zero-order sensors like the magnetometer which mea-
sures the phone’s static position or orientation, features
extracted from L2 are sufficient to differentiate between an
attack and a no-attack scenario. However for First-order
sensors such as the gyroscope, which measures the phone’s
rotation, features extracted from individual axes might be
better to differentiate between an attack and a no-attack
scenario. Single sensor defense for magnetometer was not
carried out on the IoT node.
3.3. SDI-2: Gyroscope-Magnetometer Sensor Fusion De-
fense
In contrast to the machine learning defense presented
in the previous subsection, the sensor fusion countermea-
sure works by comparing the output of the magnetometer,
~B, to that of the gyroscope, ~ω, as described in Subsection
2.2. When the readings of the magnetometer and gyro-
scope are in agreement, the equality
− ~ω × ~B = d
~B
dt
(11)
should hold, regardless of the orientation of the phone.
Therefore, any difference between the two sides of Equa-
tion 11 should indicate that either the gyroscope or the
magnetometer is being spoofed. Translating this into prac-
tice, we first calculate the values ~ζ = −~ω× ~B and ~η = d ~Bdt ,
approximating d ~Bdt by the finite difference
~B(t)− ~B(t−∆t)
∆t .
All three components (x,y,z) of both ~ζ and ~η are vectors
Figure 3: A rocking attack can be detected by the sensor fusion
mechanism
of length N for the given measurement period T = N∆t.
The mean square error (MSE) between the two signals is
then given by:
MSE =
1
T
T∑
i=1
(
(ζxi − ηxi )2 + (ζyi − ηyi )2 + (ζzi − ηzi )2
)
(12)
It is important to note that the two sensors have dif-
ferent physical characteristics. Specifically, the inexpen-
sive Hall effect magnetometer used on most phones has a
slower response time, lower sensitivity, and a higher noise
level than the gyroscope.
Figure 3 shows the output of a sensor fusion calcula-
tion, captured on the Samsung Galaxy S5 phone, both
under natural conditions (top) and under a rocking attack
(bottom). In both cases the phone was placed in the re-
searcher’s pocket while the researcher was walking around
the lab. As seen in the figure, the values over time of the
x components of −~ω× ~B (solid blue) and d ~Bdt (dotted red)
are much closer on the top half of the figure than on the
bottom half. Nevertheless, the two values plotted on the
top graph are still not entirely identical, due to the effects
of the magnetometer’s high measurement noise and varia-
tions in external magnetic sources. As it is clear from the
figure, even when the device is not under attack, there is
still a small difference in the gyroscope and magnetome-
ter reading. To mitigate these issues, we need to specify
a threshold value and assume that any deviations below
this threshold are normal. To identify the threshold, we
calculated the MSE between the two sensor signals under
typical user activity, under acoustic attack and under mag-
netic attack. Then, by using the sensor fusion MSE as a
single feature, we trained a single split binary classifica-
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Device Sampling window (sec) Accuracy (%)
Salaxy S5
1 96.98
2 99.04
5 98.82
Nexus 5X
1 98.68
2 98.38
5 97.95
Table 6: Real time accuracy of of SDI-2 with different sampling
windows
tion tree on MATLAB. Doing so we effectively instructed
MATLAB to create a threshold-based detector, choosing
an ideal threshold. When implementing the sensor fusion
defense on the device, we can use the same exact thresh-
old which was identified by MATLAB. To implement this
method, we used a sampling window approach. An attack
is identified if within the sampling window, 80% of the
MSE’s are above the threshold. We implemented the sen-
sor fusion on the Galaxy S5 using our Android app. After
extensive testing under normal conditions and in the face
of acoustic and magnetic adversary, the accuracy of sen-
sor fusion sampling is shown in Table 6. We also carried
out an offline threshold based sensor fusion defense on an
iPhone SE based on the data collected from its gyroscope
and magnetometer to obtain an accuracy of 74.4%.
3.3.1. Sensor-Fusion on IoT node
Similarly to the case of the smartphone, sensor fusion
was also implemented on the IoT node. Initially MSE
was collected under normal conditions and under attack
conditions. A single split binary classification tree using
MSE as a single feature on MATLAB was used to iden-
tify the threshold. Then, we applied the threshold-based
sensor fusion mechanism on the IoT node in real time. Af-
ter testing under both normal and attack (acoustic and
magnetic) conditions, we obtained a detection accuracy of
95.70%.
3.3.2. Improving Sensor Fusion Using Machine Learning
The advantage of the MSE threshold-based sensor fu-
sion is its simple structure. Once we identify the thresh-
old, every MSE above the threshold will be classified as
an attack. Though our experiments on both the Galaxy
S5, Nexus 5X and the IoT node showed that sensor fusion
is highly effective as it is, it can be reinforced by using
machine learning. Similar to calculating the features from
the L2 norm in single sensor defense, we can calculate the
same set of features from the MSE’s within a sampling win-
dow. These MSE based features were used to train various
machine learning models using the Classification Learner
tool in MATLAB. The accuracies were calculated using
different schemes of K-fold cross validation. The accura-
cies of various machine learning models trained and cross
validated using Galaxy S5 data are provided in Table 7.
As shown in the table, these accuracies are equivalent to
Classifier Accuracy (%)5-fold 10-fold
Fine tree 97.4 97.2
Medium tree 97.4 97.2
Quadratic SVM 96.8 97.2
Fine KNN 97.4 97.2
Bagged tree 97.9 98.0
Table 7: Offline accuracy of SDI-2 using multiple features extracted
from MSE on Galaxy S5 traces
those of the threshold-only defense, but we consider that
this design may be more robust to intentional disruption.
3.4. Real-Time Power Consumption and Performance Eval-
uation
Since our targeted devices include smartphones and
other low power devices which have a limited energy re-
serve, any practical defense must consume only a minimal
amount of power. To show that our methods provide this
property, we measured their real-time power consumption
using an extrernal lab setup, as illustrated in Figure 2.
To carry out the power analysis, we disconnected the bat-
tery from the Galaxy S5 phone and routed it through a
0.2Ω resistor connected in parallel to a high-sensitivity
Picotech TA046 800 MHz Differential probe. The voltage
drop on the probe was sampled and stored on a PicoScope
2206BMSO oscilloscope. The traces were then imported
to MATLAB for analysis. As shown in Figure 4, our de-
fenses consume a very small amount of power in excess to
the phones normal activities. To put matters in propor-
tion, assuming that the battery of the Galaxy S5 is at its
full capacity of 2800 mAh and that the phone is constantly
turned on but left idle, a phone in which our defense is al-
ways powered on will run out of battery 1.6 minutes sooner
than a phone without our defense, a difference hardly no-
ticeable by users.
Our generic fusion-based solution has very practical
computational requirements, making it feasible to imple-
ment on a variety of software and hardware targets. Even
though the mathematical model looks complex, per sam-
ple calculation of the gryoscope-magnetometer fusion rela-
tionship requires only a finite difference calculation (three
subtractions), a cross product (nine multiplications), a Eu-
clidean distance calculation (three multiplications), and
finally a comparison to a threshold. A performance evalu-
ation was carried out on the Galaxy S5 running Android
version 5.0. Using Android Studio, we measured the real-
time CPU consumption of our countermeasure at a high
resolution. Carrying out the calculations for our defenses
took between 70 and 150 microseconds. Interestingly, this
value was uncorrelated with the size of the sampling win-
dow we selected, leading us to believe that most of this
time was actually spent on inter-process communications
and UI updates, and not on the calculation itself. The to-
tal detection time is the sum of the sampling window size
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Figure 4: The effect of enabling SDI on the instantaneous power
consumption of a smartphone (top) and an IoT node (bottom)
and the time taken for calculation. Which means by using
a sampling window size of 1 second , the time for detection
will be approximately 1.0001 seconds. When running at
real-time at a sensor sampling rate of 200 Hz (the highest
rate possible on native Android applications) our fusion
calculations consumed only 0.5% of the phone’s CPU. On
our test device the app only used 1.7% of RAM, show-
ing that the countermeasure is both effective and feasible.
We note that our application did not require special user
permissions nor modifications to the underlying operating
system. We believe that integrating our countermeasures
into the device kernel will cause its resource consumption
to be even lower.
4. Towards Accelerometer-Doppler Sensor Fusion
There are spoofing attacks for the accelerometer which
completely control it (e.g. Trippel et al. [31]). Defending
against this type of attack requires that we correlate the
accelerometer reading with another sensor which measures
linear motion.
Doppler sensors are now being implemented in mobile
phones, and they will fortunately be capable of address-
ing this need. The Doppler sensor measures the linear
speed of the device, in meters per second (meter/sec), by
analyzing instantaneous shifts in the frequency of signals
the phone receives from Wi-Fi base stations and similar
stationary radiation sources, as a result of the Doppler ef-
fect. Similar to the gyroscope-magnetometer sensor fusion,
a similar mathematical relationship can be derived for
accelerometer-Doppler sensor fusion. Though this method
is equally effective, currently evaluating a full Doppler-
based defense would require us to make low-level modifi-
cations to the phone’s closed-source radio baseband stack.
Before we can relate the signal received by the Doppler
radar’s antenna to the measurements of the accelerometer,
some processing is required. Assume that the Doppler
radar emits a reference signal in the form:
x (t) =A0 cos (2pif0t)
where A0 is the amplitude of the transmitted signal. After
this signal is scattered by the moving phone, the Doppler
radar sensor receives a surveillance signal of the form:
y (t) =AR (t) cos (2pif0t+ ϕ (t)) + w (t)
where w(t) is some random noise, and ϕ(t) is a time-
dependent phase:
ϕ (t) =
4piR (t)
λ
=
4piR (t)
c
f0
λ is the wavelength of the emitted EM wave, andR (t)
is the distance of the object from the Doppler radar, which
obeys:
R (t) = R0 + r (t) = R0 +
∫ t
0
vr (t) dt.
R0 is the initial distance and vr is the radial velocity of
the object. The Doppler shift ∆f is proportional to the
time derivative of the phase ϕ (t). The received amplitude
AR (t) depends on R (t) and the scattering cross section of
the object.
Inside the Doppler radar, the received signal is con-
verted to the base-band Doppler shift signal. The conver-
sion is performed by an I/Q demodulator which mixes the
received signal with the original transmitted signal:
AR (t) cos (2pif0t+ ϕ (t)) cos (2pif0t) =
AR (t)
2
cos (ϕ (t)) +
AR (t)
2
cos (4pif0t+ ϕ (t))
and with the pi2 phase shifted transmitted signal:
AR (t) cos (2pif0t+ ϕ (t)) sin (2pif0t) =
−AR (t)
2
sin (ϕ (t)) +
AR (t)
2
sin (4pif0t+ ϕ (t))
Next, a low-pass filter with a cutoff frequency of fc =
500 Hz is applied in order to remove the high frequency
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components which yields the in-phase and quadrature com-
ponents of the baseband signal, plus some narrow-band
noise:
xI (t) =
AR (t)
2
cos (ϕ (t)) + W˜I (t)
xQ (t) =− AR (t)
2
sin (ϕ (t)) + W˜Q (t)
Note that the in-phase and quadrature components are the
real and imaginary parts of a base-band signal:
ZBB (t) =
AR (t)
2
exp (−iϕ (t)) + W˜BB (t)
We filter this signal again using a low-pass filter (in this
case, with a cutoff frequency of fc = 100 Hz) in order to
further reduce noise.
Phase relations between Ix and Qx indicate forward
or backward movements. Objects approaching the sensor
(∆f > 0) generate a -90 degree shift between Ix and Qx
outputs. Objects moving away from the sensor (∆f < 0)
generate a 90 degree shift between Ix and Qx outputs.
In order to obtain the phase we use:
ϕˆ (t) = arctan
(
−xQ (t)
xI (t)
)
where ϕˆ includes the real phase and phase noise:
ϕˆ (t) =ϕ (t) + n (t) .
We eliminate the constant (DC) part of the phase, which
is proportional to R0, by using a high-pass filter (fc =
0.5 Hz), and again use a low-pass filter to eliminate noise
and obtain the final result:
ϕ˜ (t) =
4pi
c
f0r (t) + n˜ (t) . (13)
Comparing the doppler radar to the accelerome-
ter, It is possible to reconstruct the acceleration of the
device from the Doppler shift in the frequency of the elec-
tromagnetic (EM) wave emitted by a transmitter (e.g., a
Wi-Fi access point or cellular base station) and detected
by the device. In order to compare the measurements of
the Doppler radar to the measurements of the accelerom-
eter one can either take the derivative of Equation 13, or,
in order to avoid the noise added in the process of differ-
entiation, or one can use the integral of the acceleration
(measured by the accelerometer) and apply a high-pass
filter on the result to eliminate the constant part of the
integral.
Note that this calculation requires the receiver to know
the exact shape of the transmitted waveform. In a classical
Doppler radar setup it is trivial to recover this waveform,
since both the transmitter and the receiver are in the same
physical circuit. However, previous work in the radar re-
search community has shown that it is also possible to
recover the precise transmitted waveform of an external
Wi-Fi receiver.
Assume that the transmitter and the receiver are mov-
ing in an instantaneous relative velocity ~v (t), such that
|~v (t)|  c, where c is the speed of light, while the trans-
mitter emits an EM wave with frequency f0. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the traveling wave has some
wave vector ~k that forms an angle θ (t) with the direction
of the motion of the device. Using these considerations,
the Doppler shift is given by:
∆f =f ′ − f0 =
=
v (t)
c
cos (θ (t)) f0
=
vr (t)
c
f0
where v = |~v|, vr is the radial velocity (the velocity in
the direction of the line connecting the emitter and re-
ceiver) and f ′ is the shifted frequency. The sign of the
radial velocity, i.e. the velocity times the cosine of the
angle between ~v and ~k, indicates the sign of the shift. If
the transmitter and the receiver are moving towards each
other, the sign of vr = v cos (θ) is positive and the detected
EM wave is blueshifted. If, on the other hand the trans-
mitter and the receiver are moving away from each other,
the sign of vr = v cos (θ) is negative and the detected EM
wave is redshifted.
In order to simplify the math, in this paper we have
only considered cases in which the movement of the device
is in the radial direction, i.e.: ~v ‖ ~k; cos (θ) = ±1, and the
acceleration is parallel to the velocity. In this specific case
we can derive a simplified form of the instantaneous accel-
eration, in which the same convention about the direction
of movement holds:
a (t) =
c
f0
d (∆f)
dt
Note that by using the Doppler effect, one can only
detect the relative velocity in the direction of the line con-
necting the transmitter and receiver. Reconstructing the
acceleration in the case of an arbitrary θ requires addi-
tional processing. One must also take into account the
gravitational acceleration added to the measurements of
the accelerometer; in this work we eliminated the effect of
~g by making sure that ~g stays perpendicular to the radial
velocity while measuring the acceleration of the device.
5. Discussion
We presented two effective software-only methods for
detecting acoustic and magnetic attacks on the gyroscope
and the magnetometer. We developed and implemented
our defenses, and performed detailed analysis on various
devices under various circumstances. One of the major ad-
vantages of our defense methods is that they can be used
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for all kinds of devices. Although the machine learning
models require data collection and training, this can be
done externally, irrespective of the device, and only the
trained model need to be implemented on the device. In
addition, all of our defenses were independent of the size of
the sampling window. We were able to achieve good accu-
racy with a sampling window as small as 5 ms on the IoT
node, as mentioned in the previous section. Since our de-
fense method is purely software-based, implementing this
on existing devices requires just a simple firmware update
and doesn’t require any expensive hardware modification.
On inspection, we identified that even the latest smart-
phones like the Galaxy S9 and One plus 5T etc. use similar
sensors to the ones used in our test devices. In addition,
not only the smartphones utilize these sensors -- a wide
range of electronic devices use these sensors to act as a
bridge to the outside physical world, which makes our work
all the more important in securing today’s cyber physical
systems. Our implementation on the resource-constrained
IoT node shows that even these resource-constrained de-
vices can be made safer against sensor spoofing attacks
with no additional hardware costs.
As we saw from the previous section, one of the main
components determining the accuracy is sufficient ’good’
data. A reduction in the size of the training data-set
caused the reduction in accuracy when experimenting with
one-sided single sensor defense on the Nexus 5X and Galaxy
S6. Increasing the size of the data set used to train the
model will have a significant effect on the performance of
the classifier. Manufacturers who wish to implement these
defenses can use a larger data-set, including additional user
activities from multiple users, to train the models exter-
nally before implementing the defenses on the device. In
addition, more feature engineering can be done to create
new features that can better differentiate between an at-
tack and a normal use.
5.1. Related Works
Machine-learning based methods for detecting sensor
malfunctions based on a single sensor have already been
considered in other domains, such as the field of environ-
mental sensor networks Hill and Minsker [15]. In Hill and
Minsker [15], the authors demonstrated the use of four
data-driven methods for creating a one-step-ahead predic-
tion model to create a sensor anomaly detection system,
based on order q Markov models for different values of q.
Even though this method can fit many kinds of stream-
ing data sets, it is not appropriate for use in our scenario,
where the characteristics of the signal can change dramat-
ically between consecutive samples even in benign situa-
tions. In Gunduz et al. [14] the authors reviewed a number
of proposed machine learning solutions pertaining to net-
work layer DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. In
Sikder et al. [28], the authors proposed a context-aware
intrusion detection system using a machine learning based
detection mechanism like Naive Bayes to detect attacks
which exploit the current insecure sensor management sys-
tems of smart devices.
Sensor fusion was first discussed as a defense against
corrupted sensor readings by Chew et al. in Chew and
Marzullo [4]. In this work, the authors presented a method-
ology for transforming a process control program in a way
that allows it to tolerate sensor failure. In this methodol-
ogy, a reliable abstract sensor is created by combining in-
formation from several real sensors that measure the same
physical value. Based on this work, Ivanov et al. Ivanov
et al. [16] discussed an optimal schedule for sampling from
abstract sensors in the presence of a spoofing adversary,
and performed an experimental validation of their meth-
ods on a simulation based on the Landshark unmanned
ground vehicle. In their work, Ivanov et al. sought to
minimize the intervals in which the system relies on sen-
sor fusion by choosing an optimal schedule in which the
various sensors are sampled. While this work discusses
the best detection and counter detection strategies for an
abstract sensor, it does not implement a concrete sensor
fusion algorithm, as we present in our work. Delporte et
al. made use of positional sensor fusion in a constructive
context in Delporte et al. [9]. In this work, a world frame
approximation of the gyroscope was obtained while using
a system equipped with only a magnetometer and an ac-
celerometer. Our system uses a simpler algorithm than
that used by Delporte et al. and makes fewer assump-
tions, since it is only interested in detecting incongruities
in the sensor reading and not in explicitly estimating the
sensor reading. In Fan et al. [11] sensor fusion algorithms
were used for sensor bias estimations and adaptive strate-
gies. Nashimoto evaluated in detail the security of sensor
fusion by considering a sensor fusion scenario that involves
measuring inclination, with a combination of an accelerom-
eter, gyroscope, and magnetometer using Kalman filter in
Nashimoto et al. [22]. In Kune et al. [19], Kune et. al. used
a software based method to mitigate EMI signal injection
attacks against analog sensors.
Shoukry et. al. in Shoukry et al. [25] developed a phys-
ical challenge-response authentication scheme designed to
protect active sensing systems against physical attacks oc-
curring in the analog domain while Shin et. al. developed
a method to bypass these timing based sensor spoofing de-
tection mechanism in Shin et al. [24]. Several countermea-
sures for positional sensor spoofing attacks were presented
by Trippel et al. in Trippel et al. [31]. These methods, in-
cluding in-phase sampling and randomized sampling, are
mitigation countermeasures which can degrade rolling at-
tacks, transforming them into rocking attacks, however,
it is not clear how these countermeasures can be used to
detect an attack or generally gauge the confidence level
of a certain sensor measurement. An additional drawback
of both of these methods is that they require hardware
modifications to the MEMS sensors. These are highly in-
tegrated devices with relatively long development cycles.
They are also very specific defenses tailored to the WAL-
NUT attack, and they do not prevent against other meth-
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ods of sensor spoofing. Our proposed countermeasures
only require changes to the phone software and firmware,
which is relatively quick to develop and deploy. Moreover,
our countermeasures make very few assumptions on the
attacker’s method of attack, meaning that our counter-
measure should serve well against both present and future
attacks.
As explained in previous sections, the attacks shown in
Farshteindiker et al. [12] and Tu et al. [32] are the acous-
tic attacks we reproduced to test our defenses. The list of
features used by Das et. el. in Das et al. [6] to develop
sensor fingerprints served as the foundation during the fea-
ture creation stage for our machine learning based single
sensor defense.
5.2. Protecting Against Attacks on Other Types of Sensors
Our paper shows how to protect against attacks on
the gyroscope and the magnetometer. There are, how-
ever, also attacks on the accelerometer, another common
type of MEMS motion sensor which measures the linear
acceleration of the phone Trippel et al. [31]. To determine
whether SDI can protect against attacks against the ac-
celerometer, we reproduced an acoustic rocking attack on
the accelerometer on the Galaxy S5 based on Trippel et al.
[31], and deployed the SDI-1 defense against attack using
the same methodology we used to protect against gyro-
scope attacks. Upon analyzing the data, we identified that
the attack was very effective and the sensor readings were
clearly separable from the readings from other user activi-
ties like running, walking, shaking etc. This led to most of
the machine learning classifiers having perfect accuracy of
100% in identifying an attack. However, there are spoof-
ing attacks for the accelerometer which completely control
it (e.g. Trippel et al. [31]). Defending against this type
of attack requires the sensor fusion mechanism of SDI-2,
which means we must correlate the accelerometer read-
ing with another sensor which measures linear motion, as
mentioned in Section 4.
5.3. Is the Gyroscope Truly Invulnerable to Magnetic At-
tacks?
The initial phases of our research included identifying
the effect of magnetic and acoustic adversaries on the gy-
roscope and magnetometer of the Galaxy S5. We did this
by performing frequency sweeps using the PicoScope with
our experimental setup as explained in Section 3. The
magnetometer was immune to an acoustic adversary and
vulnerable to magnetic adversary, as expected. Also, as
shown in many previous works, the gyroscope showed dis-
turbance in the face of an acoustic adversary. The gyro-
scope showed maximum variance in its readings at its res-
onance frequency range at 27 kHz. Interestingly, we iden-
tified that the gyroscope was showing disturbance under a
magnetic field as well. We were able to observe a spike in
the variance of the gyroscope readings under a magnetic
adversary which coincides exactly with the resonance fre-
quency of the gyroscope under the acoustic attack at 27
kHz as seen in fig 5. The magnitude of variance under a
magnetic adversary is much smaller than that of an acous-
tic adversary, but still significantly above the noise level of
a phone at rest. On inspecting the tear-down of the device,
we found that many of the important chips like the CPU,
RAM package, power management IC, gyroscope and ac-
celerometer chip etc are housed under a metallic covering.
This metallic covering might be causing the magnetic field
to be converted to the corresponding acoustic vibrations.
The fact that the maximum variance under the magnetic
field coincides with the resonance frequency of the gyro-
scope confirms this hypothesis. In our attempts, we were
only able to use the magnetic adversary as a rocking at-
tack on the gyroscope. Unlike the acoustic attack, due to
its properties, the magnetic field is difficult to direct and
control as needed for a rolling attack. Generating a di-
rected magnetic field which can precisely control both the
magnetometer and the gyroscope can, in theory, cause our
sensor fusion to fail.
5.4. Responding to an Attack
As explained in Section 3, our defense can detect at-
tacks but are unable to prevent them. This leads to the
natural question: what should the phone do when there is
major disagreement between its various sensor readings?
To respond to an attack, we first have to identify which
sensor has been compromised. A device equipped with our
single sensor defense for both the gyroscope and magne-
tometer will be able to detect which sensor is compromised,
but will not be able to detect a rolling attack. A system
with the gyroscope-magnetometer sensor fusion defense
will be able to detect both rocking and rolling attacks,
but will be unable to identify the compromised sensor. An
ideal system would have both the single sensor and sen-
sor fusion defenses implemented, allowing it to detect both
rocking and rolling attacks, and next to identify the sensor
that has been compromised.
Once we know which sensor has been compromised,
one possible solution is to attempt to simulate the cor-
rupted sensor using the non-corrupted one. While the
performance of this simulated sensor will be degraded com-
pared to the original sensor (i.e. lower sensitivity, longer
response time, etc.), it will still be useful in many situa-
tions. In fact, Delporte et al. Delporte et al. [9] were able
to use only accelerometer and magnetometer readings to
create a “virtual gyroscope”. Another possible solution in
the event of a sensor disagreement would be to tweak the
sensor readings until they both agree, effectively halving
the power of the attacker.
It seems that the optimal behavior in the case of sensor
disagreement which cannot be corrected would be to report
an error condition to the calling application, and leave the
decision of how to respond to the application developers.
This will allow the application to decide how to alert the
user, and how to safely and intelligently carry out at least
parts of its original intended functionality, even though it
has low confidence in the readings of the sensor. How to
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Figure 5: The effect of magnetic and acoustic adversaries on the variance of a Samsung Galaxy S5 smartphone’s gyroscope
provide this degraded functionality in a usable and generic
way remains an open question.
5.5. Improving Sensor Fusion
In this work, we showed how to improve the reliability
of one sensor reading by comparing it to another sensor.
We can generalize this notion by comparing the sensor not
just to other sensors, but to higher order state indicators
known to the phone. One such indicator that might be
combined with gyroscope readings in a sensor fusion algo-
rithm is the timing and location of touches on the phone’s
touch screen. As shown in Cai and Chen [2] and follow-up
works, the phone’s position sensor readings are so highly
correlated with touches on the touchscreen that the gy-
roscope’s output alone can serve as a keylogger. We can
reverse the direction of inference, and consider what sort
of gyroscope outputs should be detected whenever a key is
pressed. Incongruence could indicate that the gyroscope
is under a spoofing attack, or alternatively, that the touch
screen is under a touch injection attack Shwartz et al. [27].
In a wider sense, even higher-order notions, such as
the activity and general context of the phone, can be in-
corporated as inputs to the sensor fusion algorithm. For
example, when the screen’s display is off and its proximity
sensor is active, one can reasonably assume that the phone
is in the user’s pocket. As Unger et al. have shown, Unger
et al. [33] data from the phone’s myriad sensors can de-
termine many fine-grained user contexts, such as periods
when the user is eating, smoking, or listening to music.
Once the user context is established, the phone can ap-
ply a sensor spoofing detection model fine-tuned to this
context, thereby achieving better performance. Also with
more and more new sensors being integrated into the de-
vices (e.g., GPS, barometer, sonar, lidar etc.), higher order
sensor fusion has huge potential.
5.6. Conclusion
In this work, we developed, implemented and analyzed
two new defenses against acoustic and magnetic adver-
saries affecting the gyroscope and magnetometer. Lever-
aging the information advantage the defender has over the
attacker, we applied sensor fusion methods to detect when
different sensor readings on the phone disagreed with each
other.
We showed how fusion-based defenses can be applied to
the magnetometer and gyroscope. Our software-only de-
fense method can protect against attacks which cannot be
detected by other methods, including sensor replay attacks
(rolling attack). Sensor fusion defense can be augmented
by machine learning based single sensor defense methods.
Most significantly, our method has very realistic resource
requirements and does not require changes to the phone’s
hardware, drivers, or operating system. Thus, it can be
immediately put to use by phone manufacturers as well as
smartphone application developers.
In future work, it would be interesting to flesh out the
Doppler countermeasure, especially as Doppler-equipped
phones and 5G networks become more prevalent. Future
work could also focus on the evaluation of sensor fusion
defenses based on high-level context and touch events.
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